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# The critical transformation of the Cypriot communist movement: from the CPC to AKEL

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## **Abstract**

The article examines the early years of the Communist Party of Cyprus (CPC) and its critical transformation to AKEL in 1941, focusing on three issues. First, I examine the way the CPC organised itself for underground activity. Second, I look into the party's relationship with the trade union movement, which differentiates the Cyprus case from other European parties of the working class (e.g., the British Labour Party). Third, I explore the events and circumstances that resulted in the CPC's rebranding to AKEL in 1941, and the co-existence of the two parties until 1944 when the CPC voluntarily, but not without opposition, dissolved and was incorporated to AKEL. I argue that AKEL became a true mass party with considerable influence among Cypriots because of its change of position regarding the national issue of Cyprus and its engagement with practical, everyday politics via the trade union movement.

**Key words:** Cyprus, CPC-AKEL, labour movement, trade unions, colonialism

The roots of the Cypriot communist movement date back to the early 1920s. The first Cypriot socialists appeared in the late 1910s, and were involved in cultural affairs, such as the movement for modernising the Greek language.<sup>1</sup> Shortly after this movement, they founded small socialist circles and organised several public lectures. This gradually led to the formation of the Cyprus Workers Party (CWP) in 1922, within which trade unionists and communists co-existed. It was basically an amalgamation of five trade unions with a total membership of 330 workers rather than an actual party. The continuous strife between the two factions saw the communists prevailing; a decisive development that

set the pace for the entire labour movement on the island.<sup>2</sup> By February 1924, in a communiqué to the British government, they announced themselves as the Communist Party of Cyprus (CPC),<sup>3</sup> although not officially established yet. Communication with the British government was only natural. Cyprus, at the time, was a British protectorate although under a peculiar international status until 1925. In July 1878, Britain had purchased Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire – of which it had formed part for more than three centuries – but the Ottomans had maintained nominal suzerainty until 1914. When the Ottomans joined the Central Powers in the First World War (in 1914), Britain formally annexed Cyprus under a military administration status. In 1925, it was officially declared a Crown Colony.

The CPC was officially founded in 1926 by a group of radical intellectuals and workers influenced by Russia's October Revolution and is the oldest party on the island representing the working class and the poorer strata of the population. It opposed British rule and despite its small size actively participated in the anti-colonial struggle. While the powerful Church of Cyprus and the island's emerging Greek bourgeoisie advocated *enosis* (the union of Cyprus with Greece), the CPC called instead for political independence and socialism. This was related to the ethnic composition of Cyprus (82 per cent Greeks and 18 per cent Turks), as well as the party's view that the ruling class demand for *enosis* was a ploy for the further consolidation of bourgeois domination. Moreover, it reflected the decision of the Balkan office of the Comintern at the time, calling for a socialist federation of the Balkans.

The CPC consciously appealed to the Turkish Cypriots, acknowledging that the Turks would never subscribe to the *enosis* slogan. The party manifesto issued after the first official Congress stated that 'a united anti-imperialistic front could never be built on the slogan of *enosis* because it prevents cooperation with the Turkish Cypriots'.<sup>4</sup> Although the CPC failed to enlist Turkish Cypriots in its early years, this strategy remained a trademark of the party's political discourse. There was also an inherent distrust of the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie: the CPC claimed that members of this class cooperated with the British colonialists, and truthfully believed that sharing goals with the bourgeoisie was unacceptable for a communist party. The party's perception of the Russian Revolution as a historical step forward, and of the Soviet Union as an ally of the struggling Cypriot working class, created a strong ideological umbrella under which the first communists would challenge the entire structure of the Greek Cypriot ruling classes.

This article focuses on the years of CPC illegality (1931-1941) until the foundation of AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People) in 1941 and the coexistence of the two parties until the end of 1944 when AKEL incorporated the clandestine CPC. It looks at three issues. First, I examine how the CPC organised itself for underground activity. During the first years after it was outlawed, the party shrank so far that its survival was at risk. At the same time, there was a crisis of leadership since almost all party cadres were either in prison or in exile. The situation gradually changed in the mid-thirties, as a number of party leaders were released from prison/exile and the party made a serious attempt at reorganisation focusing on the trade union movement.

Second, I look at how the party penetrated and eventually took control of the trade union movement. Unlike most other countries in Europe, in Cyprus, it was the communists who initiated the trade union movement, thereby establishing their historical affiliation and tutelage over the movement. The legalisation of the trade unions in the early 1930s and the party's reorganisation opened up a channel through which the party could advance its goals. The communist networks agitated intensively among workers and successfully set up a number of trade unions in the second half of the 1930s. This set the stage for AKEL to become a mass movement in the 1940s.

The third issue concerns the events and circumstances that resulted in the CPC's rebranding to AKEL in 1941, and the co-existence of the two parties until 1944 when the CPC voluntarily, but not without opposition, dissolved and was incorporated to AKEL. I examine how the new party was able to extend its membership and support basis, and thus, finally, to become a true mass party with considerable influence among Cypriots.

### **Rioting, authoritarianism and illegality: the CPC response**

In October 1931, the Cypriots rioted against the colonial regime. Two factors led to the upsurge (*Oktovriana*): the internal division of the Greek Cypriot ruling class, which was split between radicals and moderates, and Britain's continued refusal to consider *enosis* and/or other constitutional liberties. These factors were exacerbated by the worsening economic conditions on the island. A mass meeting was held in Nicosia and soon took an anti-government character, with participants marching to the Government House. The uprising was not planned and caught all political leaders out, making it easy for the British to stop it in less than a week. The colonial administration immediately imposed repressive measures based

on the principle of communal responsibility,<sup>5</sup> including prohibition of assembly, censorship of the press, etc.<sup>6</sup> The instigators of the riots, including two Bishops, were deported and 2,000 persons persecuted; the flying of Greek flags was prohibited; the Legislative Council, a quasi-parliament granted to the Cypriots in 1882 by the new British rulers, was abolished. The October uprising caught the CPC unaware. As Vatyliotis reported to the Comintern after the events, 'our party did not anticipate the outbreak of the rebellion ... the events of 21 October took the communist party by surprise'.<sup>7</sup> Some party members took part at their own initiative but the party remained initially indifferent, a stance directly related to its inability to mobilise *en masse* in that period as it was still a small party with limited influence.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, many within the party itself doubted whether the uprising, with its nationalistic turn, was the right course with regard to the party's goals for socialism and independence. The party changed its stance a few days later and decided to become involved, so that the nationalists and the Church did not monopolise the anti-colonial riot.<sup>9</sup> As a result, despite its disagreement with the political slogan of *enosis*, the party supported the uprising, and further decided to propose to the Ethnarchy<sup>10</sup> that they take a joint stance against British colonialism.<sup>11</sup> We do not know whether this stance was influenced by the Comintern discussions in the late 1920s regarding the duties of the communist parties in the colonies to work with the 'national' sections of the bourgeoisie that fought against colonial rule. However, we do know that at least one prominent party cadre was aware of these theses (see below).

British intelligence reveals that the nationalists and the communists 'agreed to declare a strike with a view of overthrowing the Government'. However, they disagreed on the flags that would be carried in the demonstration, with the CPC delegation refusing to carry the Greek flag because they believed that this would alienate the Armenians and the Turks. The two sides also disagreed over the aim of the 'revolution'. The CPC wanted a 'Democracy of Labourers', while the nationalists sought union with Greece. Eventually, as no agreement could be reached, the CPC distributed its own manifesto on 23 October 1931.<sup>12</sup> It emphasised that a common front, which would include all Cypriot political forces and all ethnic communities, was necessary to make an effective stance against British imperialism; and further, this common goal should supersede each party's individual goals. It also condemned the neutral stance taken by local party organisations during the anti-imperialist uprising as favouring the imperialists. The party's U-turn was later criticised by the Balkan office of the Comintern because it made the party a laggard of the

nationalists.<sup>13</sup> The Comintern's handling of the CPC reveals ignorance of the local conditions in Cyprus and particularly whether the party was in a position to lead the masses, and also begs the question of how far the CPC was influenced by external factors and the Comintern in particular.

Any direct links to the international communist movement at this stage seem implausible. The party did not have a 'direct line' with the communist international movement as it did a few years later, first via the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and later with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) directly. Given that Cyprus was a small island in the Mediterranean under British rule, and the infant stage of the Cypriot communist party, links with the international communist movement were almost non-existent. The only link at this stage was Vatyliotis himself, sent by the KKE to help the CPC organise its founding conference in 1926, after the CPC requested help from their Greek comrades. Vatyliotis, before coming to Cyprus in 1926, had taken part in the fourth congress of the Comintern in 1922 and had also spent some time in Bulgaria and Moscow before returning to Greece in 1923. He next returned to Cyprus in 1930 with the task of taking over the leadership of the CPC, but after the riots he was exiled and never returned to Cyprus (he died in the Soviet Union). Being in Greece all these years working in the KKE he was informed about the workings of the Balkan office of the Comintern, was aware of the International's discussions and theses, and had probably infused them to the CPC at the founding congress since he was the author of most of the Congress theses. The smallness of the party, the lack of a social democratic 'opponent' and the colonial status of Cyprus though, meant that these discussions were not prominent within the CPC, although this does not mean that they did not influence the party decisions and strategy even unintentionally. For example, Vatyliotis and the CPC's reaction to the uprising is attributed by some authors to the contradictory framework adopted by the Comintern in the 1920s and early 1930s which oscillated between alliances with the social democrats to the theory of social fascism in the later part of the 1920s and the need to cooperate with sections of the national bourgeoisie.<sup>14</sup>

Interestingly, the same police report mentioned above also recorded a meeting between CPC officials (Vatyliotis and Skeleas) and a Turk named Mustafa Moulousi during which they 'discussed the way they should publish a notice which would please the Turks and be conducive to the interest of the Turkish labourers in order to induce them to take part in the revolution and the strike'. It was agreed that Vatyliotis would show the notice to Moulousi for approval before printing it. The communiqué

was eventually distributed but there is no indication whether it actually had any influence among the Turkish Cypriots.

Following the riots of October 1931, the party suffered serious blows: it was declared illegal, as were all its affiliated bodies; its organisations were dissolved and its offices destroyed; its leaders were exiled and almost fifty party cadres were imprisoned or internally exiled to isolated villages in the countryside. The party's two most important leaders, Vatyliotis and Skeleas (the Secretary General of the CPC), were arrested and deported on 1 November and 6 November, respectively.<sup>15</sup> During the period 1932-1933 almost all known CPC cadres were arrested and sentenced to various punishments.<sup>16</sup> As a result, the party was essentially left leaderless, as all the then Central Committee members were in prison. During the trials, the party's acting Secretary General, Costas Cononas, issued a statement renouncing his ideology, which led the party to expel him.<sup>17</sup> Essentially, the true leader of the party until the mid-1930s was Christos Savvides, brother of Ploutis Servas, who was in Moscow during the uprising and was sent to Cyprus to fill in the vacuum left after the deportation of Skeleas and Vatyliotis.<sup>18</sup>

The mass arrests paralysed the party for some months.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, the police managed to infiltrate the party lines and as such were constantly informed of the party's activities and intentions.<sup>20</sup> There were also party members who left the party because of persecution and fear of betrayal,<sup>21</sup> while British espionage tactics led to the dissolution of the Limassol and Nicosia branches with only the Famagusta branch surviving.<sup>22</sup> The fact that the CPC branch in Famagusta escaped this repression explains why the two (illegal) party congresses in 1936 and 1940 were held in this district.

The British immediately established a more authoritarian regime abolishing all elected institutions, banning all political parties and organisations and forbidding gatherings of more than five persons, which prompted different reactions among the Greek ruling class and the communists. The nationalist ruling class was unable and unwilling to resist the regime and decided early on to cooperate with the British in order to safeguard their privileges.<sup>23</sup> The British used their complicity to their advantage. Governor Reginald Stubbs's remark in 1933 was illustrative of their strategy: 'we need to breed such a class that will be willing to cooperate with us'.<sup>24</sup> To pursue this strategy the British set up a new system of governance in which all public posts were now appointed: executive and advisory councils, municipal and village councils, etc. All appointments came from the ruling class, the nationalists included, who competed among themselves for all the public offices. The mayor of Nicosia, and later leader of

the first ever island-wide party of the right-wing (the Cypriot Nationalist Party – KEK), Themistocles Dervis, is a good example of this class's willingness to co-operate for their own personal gain: in 1932 he requested permission to relinquish his Greek citizenship in order to acquire British citizenship and thus be eligible for appointment as mayor.<sup>25</sup> The British were also discreet towards the Church because they wanted to capitalise on its anti-communist beliefs that they considered as 'an invaluable asset' in their endeavours against the CPC.<sup>26</sup>

Having secured the obedience of the nationalists, the British were mostly concerned with the CPC, which they recognised as their greatest threat.<sup>27</sup> After the first shock the communists regrouped. In 1932 and 1933, several party cadres were gradually released from prison, and a first attempt at reorganisation was made. Illegal cells were set up, convening in caves and in the countryside in order to avoid arrest; party members would take food with them to hold a meeting under the guise of a picnic.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, they used aliases to conceal their true identities.<sup>29</sup> The party leadership was careful to prevent the further break-up of the party, and advised members to take all precautionary measures. For example, members were instructed not to have any communist books or proclamations in their possession in case of arrest and to refrain from discussing communism in public.<sup>30</sup>

The outlawed party operated in complete secrecy; in order to communicate its messages, it had to be resourceful. It utilised the tactic of distributing proclamations all over the island; a practice at which the party excelled in these years.<sup>31</sup> For example, on 1 August 1932 the party distributed placards calling on the people to rebel against the colonial regime.<sup>32</sup> In a January 1933 flyer the party called on the working masses to organise and fight the bourgeois polity and its representatives, i.e., the government and large companies that exploited the labourers and the peasants.<sup>33</sup> Another form of resistance involved hanging small red flags throughout towns and villages so that people passing by would see them and realise that there were still people fighting against the regime and most importantly that these were the communists.

The communist activity posed the most serious concern for the government. It constituted the only dissonance in an otherwise totally controlled, smoothly running administration.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, the British took strict measures against a movement that was gaining strength, not least owing to the passivity of the nationalists who were content with their appointments and other positions. During Richard Palmer's governorship (1933-1939) persecution of the CPC intensified. In August 1933 a new

article was added to the criminal code that directly targeted communists. The correspondence between the Governor of Cyprus, the Attorney-General and the colonial authorities is clear: 'the main object of this law is to enable the Government to cope with the growing menace of communism'.<sup>35</sup> Possession of communist books would be punished with two years imprisonment. Moreover, the Governor was vested with the authority to ban or make illegal any organisation that called for a general strike; the only organisation calling for this type of action at the time was the CPC.

### **The turn to the trade unions**

The party's illegal status and continuous persecution by the colonial authorities meant that the CPC had to find new ways to pursue its policies and appeal to the masses. Working underground, the party took advantage of the British government's decision to legalise the trade unions and channelled its activities through the trade union movement. In the second half of the 1930s the CPC re-orientated its core activities towards the trade unions – a move that proved a catalyst for its later growth into a popular party. As the sociologist Andreas Panayiotou has noted, 'under the shadow of the colonial dictatorship of the 1930s, the communists had their heroic underground phase: they became the backbone of the emerging working-class movement'.<sup>36</sup>

In January 1932 the British administration enacted legislation which in effect represented official recognition of the Cypriot trade union movement. The colonial authorities realised that the economic and social development in Cyprus was increasing the number of the working-class population, and that it was only a matter of time before trade unions became an established part of political and social life. Therefore, rather than ban trade unions, they decided instead to exercise control over them. This decision was influenced by the situation in Britain at the time: when the bill of legislation was discussed and prepared there was a Labour-led government in London until August 1931, and the subsequent 'National' coalition government included four former Labour members in the cabinet. Although in the economic crisis the British government faced a lot of pressure from the trade unions, and resisted their demands, it did not feel able to ban trade unions, even in the colonies. Trade union law in Cyprus placed trade unions under the personal supervision of the Governor; this law also specified the procedure for establishing a union. The legislation was intended to restrict communist activity while permitting trade union activity.<sup>37</sup>



In the event, the CPC saw the trade unions as an opening, and an important channel through which to exercise influence.<sup>38</sup> Work in the trade unions was the focus of the third party congress in 1936.<sup>39</sup> The party had already begun to reorganise in 1935 under the leadership of Ploutis Servas, and was gradually re-establishing its organisational capacity. Servas' role at the time was crucial since he infused great enthusiasm into the party. He had been educated in Moscow in the early 1930s where he had experienced the workings of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and he was the main figure responsible for this reorientation of the CPC. According to some sources, Servas worked towards persuading his comrades to abandon radical positions on other issues as well (e.g., religion and *enosis*), as a means to appeal more effectively to a wider audience and particularly the middle classes.<sup>40</sup> According to unpublished material from party veterans, Servas was very much influenced by the prevailing perceptions in the Comintern at the time favouring more broad approaches and emphasising the policy of the 'Popular Front'. As we shall see, this approach was also reflected later in the decision to establish a new party.

The new communist tactic soon became obvious to the British. Already in 1936 police and district commissioners reported an increase in communist activity in the labour movement.<sup>41</sup> Of great worry was the communist activity in Famagusta.<sup>42</sup> By the late 1930s, with the growth of the working class, the CPC's emphasis on the trade union movement, and its much greater organisational capacities, the party presented a highly different picture than in previous years. This was reflected not only in rising membership but also in increased instances of labour disputes. According to the British, 'the communists were undoubtedly actively linked with the strikes that took place in the first semester of 1939 ... Communist influence was much greater in the cities than in the countryside ... the police watches closely their activities'.<sup>43</sup>

Communist work and guidance in the trade unions in their formative years imbued them with particular characteristics. First, they were bi-communal, as they included both Greek and Turkish workers; this meant they were an important bridge of co-operation between the two ethnic communities of Cyprus. There were many instances of this bi-communal cooperation, which was entirely attributable to the communists.<sup>44</sup> For example, in 1936 at the American-owned mine in Mavrovouni a massive strike broke out, in which the strikers' organising committee comprised five Turks and 10 Greeks.<sup>45</sup> Other examples of Turks working with the communists include the Turkish worker Ahmet Zekki from Famagusta who was given a one-month prison sentence because the police found

communist proclamations written in Turkish in his possession.<sup>46</sup> A few weeks later another Turkish worker, Hassan Chilmi, was accused by the District Court in Limassol for subversive activity against the authorities and for propagating communism.<sup>47</sup>

Second, the unions were characterised by militancy and assertiveness because of the CPC's involvement in their organisation.<sup>48</sup> The communists offered vigour, unity and leadership to the rising labour movement. Servas described the way the party penetrated and spread within the unions as virtuosic.<sup>49</sup> For example, to allay the authorities' suspicions, the CPC sometimes placed non-communists at the head of the various unions, utilising 'front organisation' tactics that Servas had learned in Moscow. The CPC guided the unions through its members, who held leading positions in the union committees,<sup>50</sup> and this was reflected in the way demands were presented. For example, in 1938, the four trade unions legally operating in Nicosia presented the government with a memorandum demanding the resolution of a number of workers' demands. The uniform stance adopted, the language in which the memo was written and the range of demands, all point to the influence of the illegal CPC.<sup>51</sup>

Gradually, the trade unions became the main vehicle of the party's policy. They also became a basic pool from which the party garnered both members and, most crucially, the support that allowed it to establish itself and expand after the Second World War. This focus on the trade unions made sense, since the trade union movement was the only channel of organised struggle that the British were willing to tolerate.

All the available evidence supports the above conclusions. The break-up of the CPC machinery in the early 1930s is the main reason for the small number of trade unions in Cyprus at the time. The rising number of unions founded towards the end of the 1930s can be linked to CPC reorganisation in the mid-1930s. In 1937 there were only six trade unions with a total membership of 367; their number rose to fourteen in 1938, to forty-six in 1939 with 2,544 members, and further increased to sixty-two in 1940 with a total membership of 3,389.<sup>52</sup> The first ever island-wide trade union conference took place in the town of Famagusta on 6 August 1939, with 101 delegates representing thirty recognised trade unions and another twenty-seven that were in the process of becoming legally established. The increase in the number of unions and unionised workers also reveals that, as the workers gradually became aware of the power they acquired through organisation, they began to use it. This was vividly manifested in the numerous strikes that took place during this period.

In addition to working in the unions, the CPC deployed a concentrated cultural campaign among the lower social strata to awaken them to their reality and establish its presence across the island. In the late 1930s a network of cultural clubs was created throughout Cyprus, all guided by the party but operating as front organisations, involving many non-party members in their activities.<sup>53</sup> These clubs enabled the party to expand in the villages. The CPC's work in the trade union movement, together with their presence in virtually every corner of Cyprus via these clubs, made the communists an emerging third pole in Cyprus politics, in addition to the two established camps of the nationalists – moderates and intransigents.

### **A tribute to proletarian internationalism: participation in the Spanish civil war**

In this very adverse period for the party, the CPC enjoyed one of the most glorious moments in its entire history: its participation in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) in alignment with the Democratic Front of Spain against Franco. This action built a huge political capital for the party in the decades that followed. Communist parties are distinguished by their internationalism and the CPC was no different. Although it is not clear whether an official party decision was taken, it is known that several Cypriot communists joined the Spanish democrats. According to the party itself sixty Cypriot communists enlisted,<sup>54</sup> fourteen of whom lost their lives on the battlefields. The Cypriot volunteers were primarily UK Cypriots, most of whom were active members of the Communist Party of Great Britain and the League against Imperialism.

The percentage of Cypriots who fought in the International Brigades ranks among the highest of any country. With a population of only 350,000 at the time, the contribution made by the Cypriots amongst all the estimated 35-40,000 volunteers from sixty-three countries who served in Spain, is significant.<sup>55</sup> Historical research does not provide a precise number of Cypriot volunteers; instead there are accounts suggesting anywhere from sixty to 350. Cypriot volunteers came from Britain, the USA, Canada, France and some African countries. It is unclear whether Cypriots from the island itself took part in the war. Ezekias Papaioannou, the longest serving Secretary General of AKEL (1949-88), and one of the first volunteers, reports that there were no volunteers from Cyprus.<sup>56</sup> Whether there were none at all or just very few, this was due to the measures enforced by British authorities forbidding engagement on either side of the war in Spain, as well as the lack of strong organisation of the CPC

at the time. Being an island and a British colony, it was very difficult for communists in Cyprus to by-pass the restrictions and controls of the British police when travelling abroad.

Most Cypriot volunteers were communists based in London. They took part in rallies and other events held in support of the Democratic Government of Spain and many joined the International Brigades. The Communist Party of Great Britain, more precisely its Committee of Cypriot Affairs, was primarily responsible for drafting these volunteers for the war. Papaioannou, recalls how he was drafted: 'during a protest in London someone spread the word for enlisting as volunteers. I, Michalakis Oikonomides and Tony Theodoulou signed up and, in a few days, we departed for Spain via France'.<sup>57</sup> Papaioannou took part in a number of clashes before being injured in the battle of Antioucha and sent back to London. The CPC participation in the Spanish Civil War represents an important pillar of the party's collective memory, and one that celebrates its heroic and international past. The party often recalls these events as a way of rallying its supporters.

### **Launching the new party: the establishment of AKEL**

With the outbreak of the Second World War, Britain relaxed many of its oppressive colonial policies in an effort to earn the colonies' allegiance in the war. The CPC took advantage of this and decided to launch an initiative for a new political party that would appeal to other progressive and liberal personalities beyond its own members and supporters. This decision was made at the fourth CPC congress in Famagusta in May 1940. There were three main influences that led to this decision. First, Comintern had called for the creation of popular fronts in the colonies and accepted the co-operation of the communist parties with parts of the national bourgeoisie. Second, the CPC wanted to build further on its success in the trade unions and expand its appeal. Finally, it was necessary for the party to circumvent colonial proscription and operate legally.<sup>58</sup>

The founding of the new party was in a sense purposely dressed in a veil of ambiguity; a necessary condition to reconcile the hard-line positions of the CPC on *enosis* with the more accommodating positions of its potential, new bourgeois collaborators. The CPC was eager to establish this party in order to escape illegality and work with the masses. Progressives and liberals on the other hand, realised that British colonialism was entering a new, more democratic phase, and they needed the organisational infrastructure of the CPC if they were to compete with the power and the

networks already possessed by that part of their class that had co-operated with the British colonialists. This mixing of groups and people with different social and political outlooks meant that, the new party looked more like an anti-colonial, socialist party, tolerant of the divergent approaches between its different constituent units particularly regarding *enosis* than a strict, monolithic communist party.<sup>59</sup>

The party was rebranded as AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People) in April 1941. AKEL was founded at a meeting that included leading members of the CPC and several liberal personalities of the bourgeoisie. Strikingly, there were no peasants or Turkish Cypriots present.<sup>60</sup> Fifty (50) invitations were sent and thirty-seven people attended the meeting with only one woman partaking (the medical doctor Fofo Vassiliou). The patriarchal structure of Cypriot society is the main reason for the absence of women; they were kept at home and away from any political activity. Turkish Cypriots, although working with the communists in the trade unions, considered the new party a Greek Cypriot affair, a perception the CPC did not manage to change. The absence of peasants shows both the inability of the party to approach them and the mistake of the organisers not to involve them, limiting their invitations to CPC cadres and liberal and/or progressive personalities of the bourgeoisie.

AKEL was actually a manifold movement on the model of the Popular Fronts of the 1930s. The new party represented a conscious choice for a mass party organisation, highly integrated in society. The cornerstone of the party's democratic integration strategy lay in its decision to take the peaceful or electoral 'road to power'. It sought alliances with other political forces and personalities, and took a broad view of the Left, embracing the vast majority of wage earners and appealing to the middle classes at the same time. Moreover, the party was determined to engage with all issues affecting working-class people, including participation in representative institutions and in deliberations on the internal workings of the powerful Cypriot Church (e.g., the elections of Archbishop and Bishops).

This strategy led to an impressive electoral performance, participation in election-winning coalitions at the local level during the 1940s and early 1950s and a rapidly growing membership: in 1941 the CPC had 200 members, whereas AKEL's membership had risen to 3,224 by May 1942,<sup>61</sup> reaching 5,000 by 1945.<sup>62</sup> With this strategy, AKEL has been able to maintain a prominent place in the island's political landscape throughout the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, unlike many of its European counterparts. This was especially true during the 1940s, when AKEL took the initiative and the leadership of the

anti-colonial struggle from the Church and the right-wing, dominated the trade union movement and polled highly in the municipal elections (more than 50 per cent on some occasions).<sup>63</sup>

### **Internal tension**

However, the transition from CPC to AKEL was not easy; it involved considerable strife and disagreement. Prior to the AKEL founding congress in April 1941, there were serious differences among the CPC members related to the character of the new party.<sup>64</sup> The main controversy related to the relationship between the CPC and the new party. Some wanted the CPC cadres to take the leadership of AKEL too. Others opposed this. A group labelled the 'Ten Intellectuals' distributed a document declaring their opposition to the idea of founding AKEL as a front organisation of the CPC. The fundamental disagreement concerned how far the CPC should dominate the new party and how far this should be visible. The position of the 'Ten Intellectuals', guided by Adam Adamantos, later a prominent figure of AKEL and Mayor of Famagusta, argued that, in addition to certain CPC intellectuals, the AKEL leadership should feature new progressive-minded persons to provide a new face – or disguise – for the new party. They contended that this would allow AKEL to become popular quickly. Servas, then CPC Secretary General, opposed this view and the discussions within the party were long and bitter.

The congress discussed the issue and decided in favour of Servas, who represented the hard core of the CPC and who was idolised by party members at the time.<sup>65</sup> The CPC should dominate, but also guide the new party; in this way, the leadership of AKEL would remain in the hands of prominent CPC cadres so that 'AKEL would not derail to reactionism'. Nevertheless, a number of non-party members and intellectuals were also invited to the Congress, some of whom were also elected to leadership positions to show that something new had actually been born. This was a practice already tested in the trade unions where the CPC placed liberal, progressive persons at the head of the unions in order to get approval from the colonial authorities.

Phedias Kyriakides, a lawyer from Limassol and former member of the Legislative Council, presided over the congress, while another lawyer, Giorgos Vassiliades from Larnaca (later state attorney), explained the purpose of the new party. The founding declaration expressed its unhappiness over the fact that there were no Turks at the congress, and set the new party in a democratic, anti-fascist and anti-Hitler direction.

The party's founding declaration on 14 April 1941 stated: 'The founding assembly acknowledged the critical moments the world is going through and decided that the founding of the political party AKEL in a purely democratic, anti-fascist and anti-Hitler character, is fully compatible with the contemporary struggle against absolutism and violence'.<sup>66</sup> The new party unofficially disposed its own newspaper, *Aneksartitos* (*The Independent*).<sup>67</sup> A few months later, on 5 October 1941, the first congress of AKEL was convened in Limassol, where Servas was elected Secretary General, thus making him leader of both the illegal CPC and the legal AKEL. The Congress was attended by ninety persons representing the 1,284 party members at the time.<sup>68</sup> Another one-hundred non-members also attended the congress. The communists were the majority in the seventeen-member Central Committee elected at the congress.<sup>69</sup>

During the years of co-existence (1941-1944) a huge dispute erupted within the illegal CPC over whether the two parties should continue to co-exist with the CPC guiding AKEL, or whether the CPC should dissolve. It culminated at the last congress of the CPC in November 1944. Essentially, the crisis was rooted in earlier discussions regarding the leadership of the new party and was related to the character of AKEL. It was personalised by the fact that the two camps were divided between supporters and opponents of Servas.<sup>70</sup> Interestingly, Servas now changed his position and became a firm advocate of the CPC's dissolution. According to former AKEL Secretary-General Fifis Ioannou, Servas believed that AKEL had to separate from the CPC if it wanted to expand its popular appeal, as a communist headlock on the party would jeopardise its credibility. Moreover, he believed that: AKEL had grown into a truly proletarian party, opportunists had left the party, and its political programme was now similar to that of the CPC. Parallel sessions, Servas argued, only caused problems. The other side argued that AKEL was not sufficiently mature and there was the danger of 'rightist, petit-bourgeois deviations' if the CPC was dissolved. This opinion was the majority within the CPC. Ioannou branded the anti-Servas faction as the 'leftists'.

An important aspect of this discussion was the fact that the new party could offer its leaders and co-operators a chance at upward social mobility through election. The party had grown so large that there was now the real possibility that it could win state elected offices, i.e., mayoral posts and local councillor positions. In 1943, Servas was elected mayor of Limassol, and in due course it proved that he was keener to hold onto his public rather than his party office. As mayor, Servas often took a stance at variance with the party position. For example, he refused to consent

to the party decision to relocate its headquarters from Limassol to the capital Nicosia. The matter was eventually resolved in 1945 when AKEL stripped him of his position as Secretary General when he chose the office of mayor over the post of the leader of AKEL (implied in the decision to relocate party headquarters).<sup>71</sup> Moreover, on many occasions, Servas used his influence among like-minded AKEL leaders, to overturn CPC decisions that he was obligated to implement within AKEL.<sup>72</sup> One such instance took place in 1943 when the party decided to run Marcoullis as their candidate in the municipal elections: Servas overturned this decision in the local AKEL committee in Limassol, where his influence was catalytic.<sup>73</sup> With reluctance, the CPC accepted this decision, fearing a split owing to Servas's huge influence, especially in Limassol.

According to one view, Servas' great influence derived from the fact that he was one of the very few university graduates among the leadership cadres of AKEL and the CPC at the time, and Cypriot society was accustomed to deference towards the educated strata of society (AKEL's constituency not excluded). In addition, in June 1943 AKEL appealed to party members and the public at large to enlist in the British military forces to fight the Nazis, resulting in the enlistment of eleven of the seventeen-member Central Committee. As the mayor of Limassol and Secretary General, Servas remained in Cyprus, but with so many committee members away, he had more freedom to pursue his own agenda. The historian Thomas W. Adams suggested that the decision to promote enlistment was a plot by Servas to offload his intra-party competitors.<sup>74</sup>

The British were keeping a close eye on internal developments in AKEL, and their intelligence indicated that Servas was trying to mould the party along the lines of the British Labour Party.<sup>75</sup> British reports noted that Servas had been impressed by the British trade union officials during his visit to Britain in April 1945 (two months prior to his removal as Secretary General of AKEL) and that he had decided to orient the party in a more 'prolific and reasonable direction'.<sup>76</sup> This suggests that the struggle within the party at the time was more serious than just competition over a few posts. It was a struggle over the character of the party. British intelligence also revealed that, after his removal, Servas even considered announcing his own political programme that would appeal to the 'less extreme' members, and that would see him prevail in the upcoming AKEL congress (August 1945). The British reports also indicated that he hoped to establish himself as a national leader, and planned to look to the rightists for support if he failed to win the majority in the congress.



The most crucial issue at this time was the coexistence of the two parties, as this affected both the functioning and the future of AKEL. The CPC held what came to be its last congress, in November 1944, in order to decide its future, and the delegates took the difficult decision to dissolve the CPC. Servas had effectively been forced to convene this congress by a majority of the Central Committee of the CPC.<sup>77</sup> Faced with Servas' resistance, sixteen members of the Central Committee resigned from the body on 15 August 1944 and since they comprised the majority, they elected a five-member caretaker committee responsible for organising the fifth congress of the CPC. The introductory document of the caretaker committee questioned AKEL's status as the vanguard of the working class hitherto. It alleged that AKEL had admitted opportunistic and petty-bourgeois elements and held Servas, then Secretary General, responsible for this development.

The congress took place on 11 November 1944. Although most CPC cadres strongly disliked the idea of dissolving the CPC, they eventually gave their consent because they feared that the co-existence would jeopardise the existence of both parties.<sup>78</sup> They strongly believed that it was crucial that there be only one party of the working class; two centres of leadership would lead to tension and conflicts that could prove fatal for the working class and the people of Cyprus. They recognised that AKEL had already acquired a mass influence and accepted that it would be very difficult 'to change horses in mid-stream'. The congress was attended by thirty-six members of the CPC,<sup>79</sup> but Servas was not among them, even though he was still the CPC Secretary General at that time. This seems to indicate that the old guard of the party did not trust him. Discussions covered a variety of issues, ranging from Servas's role, the new party's strategy, even the name of the party as some members wanted to call it the CPC, the need to appeal to the middle class, etc. The main concern, however, related to the issue of the working-class character of AKEL and the negative influence of petit-bourgeois elements. The discussion ended with the decision to dissolve the CPC and the recognition of the need to safeguard AKEL's working class character through continued CPC presence within AKEL. They also resolved that the Secretary General should have his offices in Nicosia and that he could not assume two posts at the same time. Servas had to choose between his two offices. The congress elected a new nine-member Central Committee tasked with organising within a month the final conference of the CPC, at which time the party's changeover to AKEL would be finalised. Whether the new party venture was the result of external influence due to the prevailing *Zeitgeist* in the

international communist movement remains unclear. Party documents and even books written by AKEL cadres who later left the party give no indication, and all emphasise intra-Cyprus and intra-party factors. However, to the extent that party cadres were aware of the resolutions and the debates in the international communist movement in this period, this may have had some influence.

### The politics of ascendency

AKEL's growth into a truly popular party happened quickly. Integral and fundamental to this success were the party's involvement in trade union struggles and its reappraisal of its stance on the national question. Discussions on the party line with regard to the island's political future had been taking place in the late 1930s and the result was reflected in AKEL's eventual resolutions. While AKEL's founding declaration makes no clear reference to the issue of *enosis*, the signs of change were visible. The party demonstrated its will to fight for 'the recognition of the national identity of both communities'.<sup>80</sup> The language was vague, as calls for *enosis* were considered illegal since it would fundamentally change the status of Cyprus. The British authorities had given their permission for the founding conference but they attached strict conditions that required caution. Therefore, AKEL's declaration and statute explicitly referred to the need to work within the bounds of the existing laws when advancing the party's goals. Furthermore, the majority of CPC cadres were still opposed to the idea of *enosis*.<sup>81</sup> Nevertheless, AKEL's position was a radical departure from the CPC's position on the national issue.

The signs of change became gradually apparent. On 30 May 1942, one year after AKEL's founding congress, the party addressed a memorandum to the British Governor asking that the Atlantic declaration on the peoples' rights to self-determination be fully implemented in Cyprus, adding that this should be carried out within the context of the statement of the then prime minister of Greece, who spoke of *enosis*.<sup>82</sup> The second party congress in January 1943 demanded 'national restoration' for the people of Cyprus.<sup>83</sup> On 16 June 1943 the party called on its members and supporters to enlist in the Cyprus Regiment of the British army to fight in the Second World War in order to be able 'to claim the national, political and social future of Cyprus after the end of the war'.<sup>84</sup> The third party congress in April 1944 asked for the recognition of Cypriots' right to prepare themselves for national restoration immediately after the liberation of Greece.<sup>85</sup> The fourth congress held in July 1945 declared that Cyprus was going

through the stage of national liberation and clearly positioned the party in the *enosis* camp: 'we demand the union with mother Greece'.<sup>86</sup>

The U-turn was officially complete. Moreover, AKEL's Political Bureau declared that the CPC policy for autonomy/independence was a mistake that facilitated British imperialism since it alienated the masses.<sup>87</sup> AKEL launched the slogan of self-determination/*enosis* that remained the party's prime goal until 1958 – except for a brief parenthesis in 1947-1948.<sup>88</sup> However, AKEL never adhered to the '*enosis* and nothing else matters' perspective; instead, the party promoted the slogan '*enosis* forever', which gave them room to manoeuvre.<sup>89</sup> The party also retained several features of its former policy that differentiated it from the right-wing political forces pursuing *enosis*. These included the struggle for social and workers' rights, the demand for more political and civil liberties, and the promotion of a united anti-colonial front that included both Greek and Turkish Cypriots and left and right political forces.<sup>90</sup> These comprised the other factors that explain AKEL's increased popularity. In particular, the party's domination of the class struggle and its leading role in the labour movement enabled AKEL to put its mark on several labour achievements.

Additionally, the party tried to internationalise the Cyprus problem, both on its own and in cooperation with the Church and the right wing. The first deputation of the left alliance, which included AKEL and other personalities from the political centre, was sent to Athens and London in 1946-47.<sup>91</sup> The Greek government refused to meet with them because they considered the Cyprus question to be a bipartite issue between Greece and the UK and that its solution should be within the traditional context of Greek-British friendship.

It is important however, to place the party's U-turn on the issue of *enosis* in context. The first and most important reason for the change was the need for the party to adjust its programme to the feelings of the vast majority of the population of Cyprus (especially the Greek Cypriots) who demanded *enosis*.<sup>92</sup> This was vital if the party wanted to penetrate the masses. *Enosis* had long been a hegemonic ideology, and if the party wished to avoid the political ghetto it had to change its position radically. It decided to support *enosis*, accompanied by a renewed proposal to the Church leadership and the other right-wing political forces for a common stance *vis-à-vis* colonialism. To this end they proposed the establishment of an island-wide National Council, which they expected would cover all Cypriot political forces regardless of their different social aspirations,<sup>93</sup> however, the nationalists and the Church refused any cooperation with the communists.<sup>94</sup>

It is also important to consider developments in Greece in the early 1940s. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and its allies dominated the anti-fascist campaign (and armed struggle) after Italy and Germany had invaded Greece, and they provided the backbone of the resistance movement that rendered the KKE the most powerful actor in Greek politics. Those developments were viewed with gratification by AKEL, who believed in a victorious and socialist Greece, which Cyprus would gladly join. The united front of the left and other political forces in Greece inspired AKEL to pursue a similar course of action in the Cyprus municipal elections in the 1940s and early 1950s. Thirdly, the victory of the allies in the Second World War, and particularly the emergence of the USSR as a world power which symbolised the vision for a different world, stimulated further the party's ambitions of dominating the anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus and possibly directing the island's course towards a socialist future, or at least keeping it out of NATO. This could only be achieved via a mass party which in turn demanded a change in the goal of the anti-colonial struggle.

Finally, we must also consider that since the CPC decided to launch the new party, it was vital that it appealed to people outside the party, i.e., centre leftist bourgeois personalities. After holding series of meetings with some of them, they knew that they had to compromise their more radical positions, particularly on the issue of *enosis*, if they wanted to attract them. AKEL presented itself as a realistic and progressive party representing the interests of the working people,<sup>95</sup> acting within the boundaries of the law,<sup>96</sup> and calling for unity among all Cypriots. These positions, and the party's anti-fascist campaign,<sup>97</sup> served to increase the party's appeal among the population. In addition, AKEL monopolised the class cleavage and loudly took the initiative in anti-colonial struggle, giving it a mass character.

AKEL contributed decisively to developing the trade union movement; another crucial pillar in the process of the party's popularisation. The number of trade unions increased from sixty-two in 1940 to 143 in 1945; similarly, membership in the trade unions rose from 3889 in 1940 to 13,394 in 1945. In the 1940s, AKEL guided several strikes that resulted in important benefits for the working class.<sup>98</sup> In the immediate post-war period AKEL figured prominently in several class confrontations, which united workers from both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and culminated in a series of major strikes in 1948. These actions were crucial both to the popularisation of the party and to the silent withdrawal of the party's more liberal elements, since in the domestic context, party

ideology was considered highly subversive and revolutionary, although, compared to the CPC, AKEL's philosophy was actually reformist in both its rhetoric and its programme.

The local elections that took place in the 1940s illustrate the success of their new position. This was even more important because these elections were extremely politicised and became a battle between left and right. The party's electoral support in the municipal elections of 1943, 1946, 1949 and 1953 rose to more than 40 per cent in some cases – clear evidence of the new party's mass character. The change in position and the emphasis on the class cleavage made it possible for the party to pursue alliances with various centre-right and centre-left personalities, and this was key to breaking the party's isolation. AKEL managed to elect party cadres or like-minded candidates to the Mayor's office in a number of municipalities. Several auxiliary organisations were also established in the early 1940s that facilitated the party's engagement with society: the youth organisation AON – later EDON, the farmers' organisation EAK – later EKA, the women's organisation PODG – later POGO, etc. All served the party's goal for popularisation. The 1940s lay the foundations for the growth of AKEL and its consolidation in Cyprus society that exists to this day.

### **Concluding remarks**

AKEL was conceived as a vehicle for legal and open activity given the CPC's proscription. As such AKEL was mostly designed as a 'front organisation' guided backstage by the CPC until the latter returned to legality. Although the initial intention was not to replace the CPC by AKEL but to provide a temporary way out of illegality, it nevertheless proved a permanent development. This attests, once again, to the dialectic embedded in all actions that individuals and/or collectivities take, which tend to acquire their own dynamic once a process of change is set in motion; no one can prescribe or guarantee the final outcome. The process has its own, unknown characteristics.

AKEL was the product of conflicting views and perceptions regarding the type of party model and ways of operation, as a result of the particular circumstances within which it emerged. It was founded as a broad-church party accommodating various tendencies. It was a hybrid party that mixed communist, labour and social democratic characteristics. As such, it was forced to operate amidst ambivalences and controversies. This created a kind of dual identity for the party causing internal rifts and conflicts from time to time. Accepting its role as a mass, national party, it accepted, at the

same time, working with and within political institutions but also with and within the powerful Church of Cyprus. This meant that AKEL had to soften many of the old CPC positions as a means to appeal to a wider audience. It also played down talk of socialist transformation at least publicly, although it maintained the socialist goal throughout.

## Notes

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2. Yiannos Katsourides, *The History of the Communist Party System in Cyprus: Colonialism, Class and the Cypriot Left*, London, 2014. Parts of this article are based on this book.
3. *Pyrros (Torch)*, 21 February 1924. *Pyrros* was the official press of the CWP and the CPC until the end of 1924 when publisher and party member P. Fassouliotis renounced his ideology but kept the newspaper.
4. *Neos Anthropos (New Man)*, 18 September 1926. *Neos Anthropos* was the official press of the CPC, since January 1925.
5. The National Archives, Colonial Office, (hereafter TNA CO) 67/240/12, No. 41397/E.
6. *Cyprus Gazette* (Extraordinary), November 1931, No. 2177.
7. Cited in Manolis Choumerianos and Spyros Sakellaropoulos, 'The Communist Party of Cyprus, the Comintern and the uprising of 1931: thoughts on the 'apologia' of Charalambos Vatyliotis (Vatis)', *Twentieth Century Communism*, 16 (2019), pp103-124, 110.
8. Minos Perdios, *Essay on the History of the CPC-AKEL*, Vol. I, unpublished manuscript, 1968, p83 [in Greek].
9. Iosif Mavros, 'The CPC and the October Riots', unpublished document, 9 November 1983, kept in AKEL's museum.
10. Ethnarch literally means the leader of the nation. It generally refers to political leadership over a common ethnic group. In this case, the Ethnarch was the Archbishop of the Cypriot Church representing the single indigenous political authority of the Greek Cypriots under Ottoman and British rule.
11. Local Commandant of Nicosia to Chief Commandant of Police, Confidential Report No. 626/31, 25 October 1931. TNA CO 67/240/15 Governor Storrs to Secretary of State for Colonies Despatch No. 493, 2 December 1931. See also Georgios Savvides, 'The CPC and the policy of the united anti-imperialist front', *Neos Demokratias*, 46, (March 1976), p31 [in Greek].
12. TNA CO 67/240/15 Governor Storrs to Secretary of State for Colonies Despatch No. 473, Enclosure No. 8, 20 November 1931. See also Mavros Iosif, unpublished document.

13. *The History of the CPC – AKEL*, unpublished document, unknown author, pp178-179 [in Greek].
14. Choumerianos and Sakellaropoulos, op. cit., pp119-122.
15. TNA CO 67/240/15 Governor Storrs to Secretary of State for Colonies Despatch No. 493, 2 December 1931. CO 67/240/14, No. 41397/G Part I, 1931 Riots in Cyprus: Deportations.
16. TNA CO 67/254/1, Classified, Sir H.R. Palmer to Sir J. Shuckburgh, 14 February 1934. For the trials see for example *Eleftheria (Freedom)*, 24 January and 21 February 1934.
17. Perdios, *Essay*, Vol. I, pp84-86.
18. Rolandos Katsiaounis, 'The Communist Party of Cyprus in the decade 1931-1941', unpublished paper presented at the Conference 'The Cypriot Left in the First Era of British Colonialism, 1922-1941', organised by the University of Cyprus and the Research Institute Promitheas, Nicosia, 24-25 April 2011 [in Greek].
19. Perdios, *Essay*, Vol. I pp81-82.
20. *The History of the CPC – AKEL*, pp191-194. See also: Local Commandant of Limassol to Chief Commandant of Police, Confidential Report No. 2/25/29, 18 August 1932.
21. Panayiotis Papademetris and Petros Petrides, *Historical Encyclopaedia of Cyprus 1878-1978, Period 1931-1946*, Vol. 1, Nicosia, 1979-1980, p146 [in Greek]. See also Perdios, *Essay*, p86.
22. Katsiaounis, 'The Communist Party of Cyprus in the decade 1931-1941'.
23. Rolandos Katsiaounis, 'Cyprus 1931-1959: The Politics of the Anti-Colonial Movement', *Cyprus Research Centre Yearbook XXXIII*, Nicosia, 2007, pp441-469, p447.
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26. TNA CO 67/254/4, Classified, Palmer to Parkinson, 10 January 1934.
27. Robert Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt*, Athens, 1999, p33 [in Greek].
28. Papademetris and Petrides, *Encyclopedia*, p150.
29. Savvas Polycarpou unpublished interview, kept in PEO (Pancyprian Federation of Labour) archive. PEO is the leftist trade union in Cyprus, politically affiliated with AKEL.
30. Local Commandant of Limassol to Chief Commandant of Police, Confidential Report No. 2/27/29, 26 July 1932.
31. Koullouras Demetris, unpublished interview. Savvas Polycarpou unpublished interview. Both are kept in PEO archive.
32. 'Communist Movements', *Eleftheria*, 3 August 1932, p3.

33. 'Seizure of communist proclamations in Nicosia', *Eleftheria*, 1 February 1933, p2.
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36. Andreas Panayiotou, 'Lenin in the coffee-shop: the communist alternative and forms of non-western modernity', *Postcolonial Studies*, 9, 3 (2006), pp267-280, 269.
37. Andreas Ziartides, 'Trade union development in Cyprus', Nicosia Municipality Publications, Popular University Lectures, No. 2, Nicosia, 1986, pp107-112, p115; Andreas Phantis, *The Cypriot Trade Union Movement in Anglokratia (1878-1960)*, Vol. I, Nicosia, 2005, p69 [in Greek]. The first union to be registered under the new law was the union of the shoe makers of Nicosia on 11 May 1932.
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47. *Chronos*, 4 October 1933.
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50. Phantis, *The Cypriot Trade Union Movement*, pp92-94.
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63. ASKI, F-20/21/46, 'The struggle of the Cypriot people for liberty and peace', 18 October 1951, p7.
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65. Ioannou, *The Left and the Cyprus Problem*, p21.
66. AKEL, Founding Declaration, 14 April 1941, cited in *Political Decisions and Resolutions of the Congresses of the CPC and AKEL*, Nicosia, 2014, p53.
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69. AKEL's Congress, *Aneksartitos*, 5 October 1941.
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71. Andreas Phantis, *The Constitutional Treaty*, Nicosia, 1993, p50 [in Greek].
72. Ioannou, *The Left and the Cyprus Problem*, p28. A similar opinion is shared by Phantis who charges Servas with contempt and disobedience towards the decisions of the party, Phantis, *The Constitutional Treaty*, p50.
73. Katsiaounis, *Constitutional Treaty*, p138.
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95. 'The First Congress of AKEL', *Aneksartitos*, 8 October 1941.
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97. See for example, 'A day's labour for the defence of Cyprus', *Aneksartitos*, 30 August 1941.
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